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The title of the research is: The Impact of Audit Quality on Stock Prices in Japan: Based on the Case of 
Accounting Fraud in Kanebo, Olympus, and Toshiba. The research studies the chronologicals of the 
three major accounting scandals occurred in Japan: Kanebo and ChuoAoyama, Olympus and KPMG 
Azsa, and Toshiba and Ernst & Young ShinNihon. Which all of the external auditors are part of Big-4 
audit company in Japan. This research uses the events as evidence to highlight the importance of audit 
quality and how it influences the stock prices. The worse the audit quality, the more it is for investors to 
lose their confidence and trust on the company‘s financial statements, which would influence the stock 
price to decline due to investor sentiment caused be loss of confidence in the stock markets. Through 
analyzing and describing based on each significant event of each scandal, we have a better grasp on the 
matter. The research uses Case Study Method that helps the author to determine which specific event 
would cause market reaction in the form of changes in stock prices, with the purpose of providing 
evidences that support this research. This research tries to explain that audit quality plays crucial role in 
determining the sentiment of the investors, considering that fraud, misstatement, or error in the financial 
statements can be detected and prevent providing poor audit quality if the auditors are unable to 
implement the core functions and understand what are the indicators of audit quality. 
 




There are 4 existing stock exchanges that are included in Japan‘s stock exchange (kabushiki 
kokan); Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), Sapporo Securities Exchange (SSE),  Fukuoka Stock  
Exchange  (FSE),  and  Nagoya Stock Exchange (NSE). Among those 4 Japanese stock 
exchanges, Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), which has 3,500 listed companies (2016) 
according to Trading View,  is the biggest Japanese stock exchange while also ranked number 
4 as the biggest stock exchange worldwide. Nikkei, or short for Nikkei 225 Stock Average, is 
the leading index of Japanese Stocks. 225 Stock Average indicates that it consists of 225 
Japanese companies that trade in Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) regardless of their business 
sectors. Major stock index that is similar to Nikkei is Dow Jones Industrial Average Index from 
United States which also uses price-weighted index for its weighting method. However, Nikkei 
is not the only stock index in Japan. Another Japanese stock index is TOPIX (Tokyo Price 





Index) which, different from Nikkei, uses capitalization-weighted index as the weighting 
method. While Nikkei is equivalent to DJIA Index, TOPIX is considered to be equivalent with 
S&P 500 from United States. However, in order to maintain a well-functioning stock markets 
investors‘ confidence must always be maintained, which is driven from investors‘ need in 
looking for assurance in companies‘ financial reports. Auditing the financial reports of the 
company is fundamental in building confidence in financial information that will be presented 
to investors by the management, the confidence of investors is one of the main reasons for 
stock markets to run efficiently. 
 
Audit quality and the factors that could influence have been a fascinating subject in academic 
studies. There have been few studies and debates that discussed the subject following the 
collapse of a company. Stated by the previous study by Noor Adwa Sulaiman (2018), some 
developments regarding auditing and financial reporting conducted by professional bodies and 
regulators are implemented in order to improve audit quality.  Auditing of financial  
statements caters  as a control mechanism for reducing information unevenness while also 
protecting the interests of the differing claimants by making sure that the audited financial 
statements are free from misstatements (Macharia and Gatuhi, 2013). The main purpose of the 
audit itself is to improve the degree of confidence by people who are the users of the company‘s 
financial statements. Those users are consisting of shareholders, creditors, or even newcomers 
who are interested in building a business relationship. When a financial statement has low risk or 
low perils on misstatements, it would increase confidence in stock markets (Hoti, 2012). For the 
players in the stock market, it is crucial for a financial statement to be audited by dependable 
auditors as it indicates to the market that the financial statements are more reliable than those 
audited by unreliable auditors. 
 
Since a long time ago, external auditing has been a part of a crucial function of economic 
activity. Therefore, in order for economic activity to keep on progressing, trust is an important 
thing to maintain. This is where auditor‘s independence plays a crucial role in contributing to 
the confidence of the company‘s shareholders, by providing them with reliable and unbiased 
view on company‘s financial information. Those independent opinion given by the auditor will 
then become an important portion of an efficient capital markets (The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, 2002). In 1949, Japan adopted the Accounting Principles 
for Business Enterprises, which were the country's first accounting standards. CPAs have been 
auditing the financial statements of publicly traded firms since 1951, according on these and 
other criteria, as well as the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948. Stated by Naoki Kasai 
(2014), since 1948, financial statement audits by certified public accountants have played an 
important role in Japanese capital markets as they do in markets in other developed countries. 
Japan has been hit by one of its biggest accounting scandals after Kanebo, who was one of the 
largest producers of cosmetics in Japan, admitted it had booked 215 billion yen of fictitious 
profits in its accounts during 2005, with the involvement of ChuoAoyama, who renamed their 
company to Misuzu in 2006, partook the scandal as Kanebo‘s auditor, was part of Japan‘s big 4 
accounting company who happened to audit big companies such as Toyota, Sony, and Nippon 
Steel Corporation as well. The event led to the suspension of ChuoAoyama for two months in 
2006 by the Japanese Financial Services Agency (FSA). Few major fraud cases happened in 
Japan even after Kanebo and ChuoAoyama case such as: Olympus and KPMG AZSA in 2011; 
and the most recent one was Toshiba and Ernst & Young ShinNihon that happened in 2015. 






ChuoAoyama was an affiliation of Price water house Coopers (PwC) in Japan. Before the 
scandal, it was one of the four biggest accounting firms in Japan. One of ChuoAoyama‘s clients 
is Kanebo, whose businesses are in cosmetics, chemicals, foods, and textiles after World War II. 
Unfortunately, with the fall of the boom economy in the early 1990s, it had managerial 
problems. Between other departments, the textile department experienced significant losses 
(Konishi, 2010). However, the bloated numbers in the financial accounts for 5 years—
specifically, the fiscal year ending March 2000 up to 2004—reached to 215 billion yen (around 
US $2 billion), according to the conclusions of their internal investigation are caused by the 
manipulated firm‘s books from the 1990s done by the executives of Kanebo. The earnings of 
Kanebo were manipulated by the company's executives, who deleted 15 unsuccessful Kanebo 
subsidiaries and linked companies from the list of Kanebo entities that used consolidated 
accounting to hide losses. They also postponed declaring stock, investment, loan deficits and 
overstated their sales as well as understated the costs. 
 
The name of Toshiba Corporation was officially made in 1978, after the merger of two firms; 
Tokyo Denki and Shibaura Seisaku sho in 1938. Toshiba became the 4th largest chipmaker and 
the 3rd largest laptop computer manufacturer in the world. However, in April of 2014, the 
Japanese business sector was stunned to learn about Toshiba Corporation's significant 
accounting fraud. The fraud involved ¥224.8 billion or US $2 billion from 2008 until 2014. 
Accounting problems that result in financial statement window-dressing are primarily caused by 
cooperation among management and accountants, as well as professional negligence. Despite 
the fact that Ernst & Young ShinNihon is one of Japan's largest auditing firms and has been in 
responsibility of Toshiba's books for sixty years, it failed to do its duty. Since 2008, its audit 
staff has failed to identify the errors for eight years in a row and proceed to provide no 
suggestions and advice to the management for improvement. 
 
Meanwhile, the Olympus affair began on October 14 2011, as British-born Michael Woodford 
was abruptly removed as CEO of Olympus Corporation. Woodford has been the president of 
Olympus for 6 months when he exposed the fraud inside the company. The fraud itself has 
been known as "one of the biggest and longest-running loss-hiding arrangements in Japanese 
corporate history" according to The Wall Street. The use of accounting methods by Olympus to 
conceal large losses has sparked doubts about whether the company's auditors, the Japanese 
arm of global powerhouse KPMG  Azsa, should have gone more to investigate the red 
flags. These three big accounting scandals have completely failed in its professional auditing 
duties and resulted to the public‘s trust in CPAs being shattered. The accounting fraud 
practiced by the ChuoAoyama, KPMG Azsa, and Ernst & Young ShinNihon caused auditor 
switch among its clients. Auditor switching is an alteration of audit firm that is done by the 
company (the audit firm‘s client) from its own will or government regulations. When confronted 
with litigation or criticism, a company is likely to change auditors, either because of discontent 
with the previous auditor‘s audit quality or because litigation against the auditor leads in the 
auditor losing their independence from the company and being unable to do the audit. Identical 
to what happened in U.S with Enron/Andersen scandal that led to the making of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX), in 2006, Japan also encountered the crash of its Big 4 audit firms which 
then also led to the making of Japanese Sarbanes-Oxley (J-SOX). Switching auditors does 





not only mean there is an accounting scandal performed by the auditor that worries its clients, it 
could also imply that there is an accounting disagreement between clients and auditor, 
prompting them to seek out another auditor that agree (McConnell, 1983). However, according 
to Nikkei Asia in 2020, in Japanese case, almost 70% of listed companies have not switched 
audit firms in over a decade, believing that a new auditor would not completely understand 
their business. Due to avoid client-auditor close- relationship that could lead to financial fraud, 
European Union (EU) policy require listed firms to switch auditors every ten years in 
principle. Once the audit quality of a company's financial reporting is questioned, it's likely 
that the company may switch auditors to prevent the capital market implications of potentially 
incorrect financial reporting (Hennes, et al. 2011). 
 
This study is intended to provide additional empirical evidence on the impact of 
announcement of an audit firm that fails to provide good audit quality and detect fraud on their 
client‘s financial reports. And what performing poor audit quality and accounting scandal could 
render to stock markets‘ doubts. So, The research questions below represent the research 
problems: 
 Due to Japan as a low-litigation setting, how does audit failures affect reputation loss in 
each case? And how does it affect auditor switch too? 
 What are the things that caused the deterioration of audit quality performed by 
ChuoAoyama, Ernst & Young ShinNihon, and KPMG Azsa during the period of the 
accounting fraud? 
 What is the stock market reaction following the scandal of each case? 
 
 
2. Literature Review & Theoritical Framework  
 
2.1 Agency Theory 
 
According  to  Agency  Theory,  agency  relationship  is  when  one  or  morestakeholders 
engage another as their agent for the purpose of performing a service on their account. As a 
result of providing this service, the agent is given some decision-making responsibility (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Simple agency model indicates that stakeholders lack motives to rely their 
agents as a result of information asymmetries and self-interest, and that they will strive to address 
these concerns through implementing procedures that align agents‘ objectives with stakeholders 
and decrease the potential for information asymmetries and opportunistic behavior. Different 
incentives and information asymmetries could cause concern about the accuracy of the 
information, which has an influence on stakeholders‘ faith in their agents. There are a variety of 
strategies that can be employed to try to balance the interests of agents with the goals of the 
organization. An audit helps preserve confidence and trust by providing an independent audit on 
the activity of agents and the information they offer (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England & Wales, 2005). Simplest agency model implies that no agents are reliable, and that if 
an agent can profit at the cost of a principal, they will do so. Auditors are hired as contract agents, 
regardless, they are required to be independent from the agents that are in charge of the business. 
In this setting, the major aim is accountability of the audited accounts, as audits serve to 
maintain confidence and transparency. In a simple agency audit approach in which a professional 
independent auditor is brought in and a statutory audit is conducted to help resolve a simple 





agency issue between directors and shareholders. However, there are additional variables 
involved, such as the connection between auditors and other stakeholders that have interest in the 
audit‘s outcome. 
 
2.2 Audit Quality 
 
According to De Angelo (1981), she defined audit quality services as ―the market-assessed joint 
probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client‘s accounting system 
and (b) report the breach.‖. Based on the previous study conducted by De Angelo she made a 
theory that says big companies would have a good quality auditor to assess their financial 
statements because big companies have bigger reputation at stakes compared to smaller 
companies. And big companies also possess more resources to hire professional auditors with 
good performance. Palmrose (1988) argues that higher level of assurance means higher quality 
of audit services. Which means negligence and misstatement, or an audit failure, have a low 
possibility to be found in a high quality of audit services. Auditors who are known or have the 
reputation for their ability in discovering and reporting misstatements in a financial statement, 
have more reasons or incentives to maintain their good reputation by making sure that they 
always provide a high- quality audit service. That argument can be justified because according to 
Davidson, Stening, and Wai (1984), ―Audit quality is the accuracy of auditor‘s information 
reporting.‖ Based on the arguments presented by several authors on their research regarding 
audit quality, it can be said that audit quality is not defined by law or regulations (Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 2002). Eventually auditors should be able to 
present high-quality audit reports to the shareholders, in a sense that the information presented in 
the reports are independent; unbiased; and supported by sufficient evidence. According to 
IAASB (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board) audit quality has four basic 
aspects. 
 




2.2.1 Auditor‘s Independence 
 
Auditor independence plays a very crucial role in measuring audit quality according to Arens, 
Elder, Randal, Beasley, and Mark (2014). Auditor independence can be defined as an auditor‘s 
unbiased mental attitude during the process of auditing a company‘s financial statements. An 
auditor can be perceived as not being objective or biased when they show their lack of 
independence throughout the financial reporting process, which also indicates the possibility of 
the auditor to not report detected breach (DeAngelo, 1981). Although auditor independence 





plays a significant role in audit quality, some companies seem to ignore the importance of 
auditor independence in determining the quality of their financial statement as those companies 
whose financial statements were audited with unqualified auditor fell apart shortly after the 
public knew about the misstated financial statements (Deirdre, 2010). The role that auditor 
independence plays in audit quality is very fundamental because it helps to determine it. Thus, 
when the auditor is not independent it will cause the collapse of a company as it decreases the 
confidence of investors on that particular company‘s financial statements. 
 
2.2.2 Auditor‘s Competence 
 
Professional capacity is considered as an important factor affecting the quality of technique, as 
well as the satisfaction of subjects using audit results (Boon,  2007).  And  according  to  
Kharismatuti  and  Hadiprajitno  (2012), competencies can be defined as a personal aspect of a 
worker that allows them to attain greater performance. Several of previous empirical studies 
explained that competence has two elements which consist of experience and knowledge and 
these elements help to contribute to the auditor‘s ability in performing good audit quality. Based 
on the research study about the effect of competence on audit quality done by Ramlah, Syah, and 
Dara (2018), they explained that the most important thing in establishing auditor‘s competence is 
through training. They argued that by giving extensive training to auditors will form higher skills 
on them from more and more courses that the auditors took. 
 
2.2.3 Auditor‘s Skepticism 
 
Concerns regarding situations in which auditors did not adhere professional skepticism 
effectively in their audits are a common thing in audit evaluation results around the world, and 
have been a hot topic in terms of audit quality. The word  ‗professional‘ in professional 
skepticism refers to the fact that auditors have been, and continue to be educated and 
improve to apply their expertise in making decisions according to professional standards 
(Quadackers, 2009).  In the context of audit, professional skepticism is an approach  in 
auditing that involves a critical evaluation of evidence, the ability to observe and detect fraud, 
becoming more conservative in audit judgement, and keeping skepticism on evidence presented 
by clients (Hurtt et al., 2013). According to Professional Standards of Public Accountant 
(2011), professional skepticism is being defined as ―an approach that involves a questioning 
mind, being alert to conditions which may signal possible misrepresentation caused by error or 
fraud, and a critical examination of audit evidence.‖ With professional skepticism, auditors will 
have a way of thinking in which they don‘t take audit evidence without questioning them. 
Instead, the auditor conducts the audit with a reasonable amount of caution degree through 
asking investigative questions, critically analyzing answers, and carefully compare the results of 
the analysis with the obtained evidence. 
 
2.2.4 Forces That Influence Audit Quality 
 
In a well-functioning capital market, high-quality auditing plays a fundamental part. According 
to the prior research conducted by Douglas J. Skinner and Suraj Srinivasan (2012), there are 
two forces that influence auditors to perform high quality audit; litigation incentive and 
reputation incentive. Audit quality function includes auditor‘s reputation thus the announcement 





of new corporate financial information will influence economic value of auditors. The 
insurance/litigation and the reputation are two opposing concepts in accounting literature that 
characterize the relationship between audit quality and its economic value (Frendy and Hu, 
2014). 
 Litigation Incentive 
Litigation risk often occurs in audit companies since their duty is to provide assurance 
by reviewing and evaluating the company that hires them to detect any inefficiencies in 
the company‘s internal control, to investigate potential theft and fraud, to help the 
company in achieving their objectives, and to company whether or not the financial 
report of the company is accurate and comply to the regulations. Therefore, there will 
always be a possibility of litigation coming from stakeholders if they think there has 
been some negligence done by the auditor. The process of a lawsuit takes a lot of 
expenses and time, which is why avoiding litigation is an incentive for an auditor to 
perform a high-quality audit. However, because shareholders and other third parties have 
had trouble obtaining cases against auditors, Japan has been viewed as a low-litigation 
country (Numata and Takeda, 2010). 
 Reputation incentive 
Good reputation is essential for an auditor, and in order to achieve that auditor must avoid 
audit failure to indicate their quality in audit. Since the capital markets depend on the 
accuracy and reliability of audited financial statements for consideration when making 
decisions (Kronenberger and Pietzsch, 2017), the need for auditor with lack of audit 
failure in their past performance is needed to show that the auditor who assess the financial 
statements has a good reputation. The urge for audit companies to have bigger and better 
reputation incentivize them to provide credible financial statements by changing their 
auditors in order to avoid the declining of their audit quality. Based on the previous studies 
done by Skinner and Srinivasan in 2012 as well as Kronenberger and Plietzsch in 2017, the 
evidence in their arguments point out that litigation and reputation give incentive for audit 
quality. A litigation against an audit company gives a negative impact on client‘s equity 
securities prices (Franz, Crawford, and Johnson, 1998) because when a lawsuit against an 
audit company happens, it indicates that there have been audit failures and carelessness in 
their assessment. Thus, related to the indicators that define the quality of an audit 
mentioned before, the value in the opinion of the auditor on audited financial reports will 
be reduced as well as their reputation. When auditor‘s opinions‘ value has decreased and 
their competencies are questionable, the confidence of shareholders and investors on the 
accuracy of the company‘s financial report will also decline and result in the fall in 
company‘s security prices. 
 
 
2.3 Theoritical FrameWork 
 
A good framework will explain theoretically the relationship between the variables to be 
studied. According to Uma Sekaran (Sugiyono, 2017), framework is a conceptual model 
concerning about how the theory correlates to variety of factors that have been defined as 
fundamental problem. Meanwhile, according to Suriasumantri (Sugiyono, 2017) framework is a 
temporary explanation of the symptoms that are the object of the problem. Based on the 
discussion, it can be concluded that  the framework  is  a conceptual  temporary explanation  





of the relationship between each object of the problem based on the theory. Audits play a 
critical role in building assurance and establishing trust in financial data. Understanding how the 
audit quality has progressed requires an understanding of the principal-agent relationship, as 
portrayed in agency theory. The knowledge asymmetry among principals (shareholders) and 
agents has been studied extensively using agency theory (management). The agency theory is 
used in this research to examine the impact of audit quality on the stock prices. This research 
aims to establish the context for that development, with a particular focus on shareholder-director 
agency relationships in understanding the significance of audit quality for investors. 
Understanding how the function of an auditor has evolved requires an understanding of the 
principal-agent relationship as portrayed in agency theory. Agents are appointed by the 
principals, who delegate certain decision-making authority to them. By doing so, the principals 
are putting their faith in their agents to operate in their collective interest. Principals may lack 
faith in their agents as a consequence of information asymmetries among principals and agents' 
differing motives, and may need to put in place mechanisms, such as audit, for strengthen this 
trust. As a result, agency theory provides a valuable economic theory of accountability for 
explaining the growth of audit quality. Concerns about financial information's trustworthiness 
serve to explain why the audit is considered as a crucial method for shareholders to assure that 
the directors are managing the firm in the best interests of the shareholders, thus as an external 
auditor, auditor must perform good audit quality in making sure that the financial reports they 
are auditing are reliable for the shareholders to use. To measure if an auditor is able to perform 
good audit quality, there are three indicators to acknowledge; independence, competence, and 
skepticism. In order for auditor to provide reliable audited financial reports, they must possess 
all those three indicators. There are consequences if unfortunately the auditor fails to provide 
reliable audited financial reports to shareholders. Those consequences can come from litigation 
risks and reputation risks. However, this research is using Japan as the background setting due to 
its low-litigation settings. With the minimal litigation risks of auditing, Japan is rather strong 
for identifying the value of reputation for auditing which will be useful in examining the risks of 
audit failure to investors through reputation loss in a country where litigation incentives is 
lacking. 
 
In order to study the impact of audit failures to the stock prices through the loss of the external 
auditor‘s reputation, this research is using Case Study Analysis with the purpose of observing 
and analyzing how companies who conducted accounting fraud with external auditors who fails 
to identify the misconduct in their clients‘ financial reports could affect the state of stock 
markets‘ effectiveness and influence the stock prices of such companies.  
 
3. Research Methodology And Data Analysis Technique 
 
3.1 Research Method 
 
Correlating to the purpose of the research mentioned in Chapter I: Introduction, this research is 
categorized as basic research that aims to expand theories, and knowledge of scientific 
understanding. The nature of this research is  qualitative  descriptive which  is  a  method  of  
research  that  explains  the characteristics of the phenomenon studied. This methodology pays 
attention to the ―what‖ of the research subject rather than the ―why‖. With the use of literature 
review in Chapter II, gathered from the previous research, this research adopts secondary data, 





the data that has already been obtained through primary sources and made available for other 
researchers to use for their own research. The data obtained for this research are collected from 
books, reports from official accounting institutions, and academic journals from ScienceDirect, 
Google Scholar, and other trusted journals. The object of this research is the impact that comes 
from audit quality. In this research, audit quality and reputation incentives are the x variable in 
this research which indicates that it stands as the independent variable affecting the dependent 
variable (y). Thus, making stock markets‘ performance and auditor switch as the dependent 
variables in this research. Subjects are the parties that are the target for data collection in the 
research study. Therefore, the subject of this research are the stock prices as well as auditor 
switch that are being affected by the audit quality of a company‘s financial statements in Japan. 
In this research, stock prices and auditor switch can be classified as the y variable which means 
it stands as the dependent variable. 
 
3.2 Data Analysis Technique 
 
To analyze the impact of audit quality in Kanebo, Olympus, and Toshiba‘s financial reports on 
the stock prices of those Japanese companies, this research is adopting Case Study analysis 
where it is designed to inspect the effect of an event on a specific dependent variable, 
commonly used dependent variable in event studies is the stock price of the company. 
Researchers can use qualitative case study methods to perform in-depth investigations of 
complex phenomena in a specific environment. According to Baskarada (2014), in academics, 
the case study approach is the most commonly utilized method for qualitative researchers. 
However, there has been a limitation in obtaining data for Kanebo stock price since the 
company itself had been delisted by Tokyo Stock Exchange since 2006. Therefore, in order to 
fill the gap, this research choose to analyze based on the stock prices of companies audited by 
ChuoAoyama instead to support the research. 
 
4. Result And Discussion 
 
Kanebo/ChuoAoyama, Olympus/KPMG AZSA and Ernst & Young, and Toshiba/Ernst & 
Young ShinNihon in order to explain the influence of poor audit quality in their companies‘ 
financial reports on the stock market prices. To better analyze the case, that are part of the Big 4 
Auditors, presented poor audit quality of financial statements which later on triggered reactions 
from the stock market players. The following discussions in each of the table are arranged 
chronologically. 
 
4.1 Kanebo and ChuoAoyama Case and Reputation Loss 
 
The case of Kanebo/ChuoAoyama was significant in the history of accounting fraud because it 
represents the biggest amount of manipulation in Japan. Event 1 took place when the fraud was 
first exposed for their fraud which later on would create mistrust and doubt among investors on 
Kanebo‘s audit quality. The Japanese company that manufactures cosmetics, skincare, 
makeup and hair care was in the middle of an in-house investigation or arestructuring 
operation with the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ) when they detected 
accounting fraud in Kanebo‘s operation. Few months after Event 1 happened, Kanebo decided to 
fire their auditor for helping and giving their approval to their previous financial statements in 





the fiscal year 1999-2003 that were overstated by the executives in Kanebo, former President 
Takashi Hoashi and former Vice President Takashi Miyahara, in order to hid their losses which 
reached the amount of ¥81.9 billion in 2001 and ¥80.6 billion in 2002 alone. And since a 
deceptive financial statement is harming investors‘ confidence, Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) 
decided to delist Kanebo from the capital market. Maintaining investors‘ confidence and 
convincing them their interests are fully prioritized are necessary to create an efficient and 
organized market. Another reason is because capital markets go together with civilizations seeing 
that capital markets have been contributing in development and expansion such as helping in 
financing the railroads and warranting capital for companies that are in need. Accordingly, the 
significant need for reassurance and security of capital market players is ―as old as the markets 
itself‖. Prior to their decision in delisting Kanebo, Tokyo Stock Exchange had delisted Seibu 
Railway in December 2004 after they were proven to forge fraudulent reports for more than 
40 years. The similarity between Kanebo and Seibu Railway can be located in their illegal 
actions of hiding the company‘s losses and overstating their earnings in order to present their 
financial statements as healthy to the investors, which violated the rules regulated by Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. A stock can be delisted if it meets any of the criteria for delisting stocks 
mentioned above, and with Kanebo‘s fraudulent action in manipulating their financial statements 
with the help of their three external auditors from ChuoAoyama to cover the liabilities that 
exceed their assets, they had met one of the criteria for delisting stock from Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. After the announcement of Kanebo‘s delisting from the stock list in Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, in September 13th  2005, the three external auditors from ChuoAoyama were being 
arrested for cooperating with the former executives in forging the financial statements, 
following the arrestment of the three former executives that were arrested in July 2005. Prior to 
the arrestment of the three auditors, Tokyo District Public Prosecutor‘s special investigation 
department had the authorization to search ChuoAoyama‘s offices to obtain sufficient evidence. 
The prosecutors deemed that the auditors were acknowledging the fraud in the company‘s book 
but they still approved them anyway. The three auditors were also deemed to be highly immoral 
by the prosecutors for suggesting on how to falsify the financial statements to the former 
managers. After the arrestment of the three auditors, in May 2006, Financial Services Agency 
(FSA) deregistered them and command the suspension of ChuoAoyama, from their core business, 
which is auditing service, in the course of two months starting from July. FSA‘s settlement to 
suspend ChuoAoyama marked as the first major audit company to get suspended in Japan.  
 
4.2 Toshiba and Ernst & Young ShinNihon Case and Reputation Loss 
 
Event 1 started in  April 2015 when Toshiba was suspected for doing improper recordings 
for 7 years on their financial statements that later exposed Toshiba‘s executives. The accounting 
irregularities in Toshiba came to SESC‘s attention after there had been an anonymous tip that the 
company had been inflating their profits for $1.2 billion. The news of Toshiba‘s accounting 
scandal expanded internationally, and seeing that Toshiba‘s scandal happened after Kanebo and 
Olympus, it provoked a question among investors about which Japanese major company will be 
disclosed with fraud next. Given thought to the magnitude of the scandal and its impact on the 
view of Japanese corporate governance, SESC announced to impose fine to Toshiba with the 
amount of ¥7.37 billion ($60 million) and to put them under surveillance which means they had 
to hand over report about their internal controls‘ improvements, in order to regain the market‘s 





confidence, in December 7
th 2015. In Event 3, just like its client, Ernst & Young ShinNihon 
was imposed with fine by the Financial Services Agency (FSA) with the total of ¥2.1 billion 
($17.4 million) and a suspension from doing their audit services for three months long. Just like 
the case of ChuoAoyama, the suspension of Ernst & Young ShinNihon was part of a 
disciplinary action against an audit company and CPA who were providing poor audit quality. 
The updated outline of audited financial result of Toshiba by Ernst & Young ShinNihon under 
the supervision from Independent Investigation Committee. Toshiba conducted accounting 
fraud by overstating their number of profits for ¥152 billion and also understating the costs 
within their numerous of business units through the period of 2008 until 2014. Toshiba had been 
audited by Ernst & Young ShinNihon for sixty years. The company implemented U.S. GAAP 
for financial reporting and was audited according to Japanese auditing standards for the relevant 
years.  
 
After the scandal of Toshiba came to public, Ernst & Young ShinNihon was then given fine for 
¥2.1 billion or $17.3 million by JFSA (Japan‘s Financial Services Agency). due to intentionally 
ignored the irregularities that occurred in Toshiba‘s financial reports for more than 6 years. 
However, this intentional action coming from Toshiba‘s external auditor can be traced to their 
long relationship as auditor-client without any audit rotation at least every seven years as it has 
been regulated in JICPA (Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants) to avoid any bias 
from the auditors in performing their duty. The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) published a paper in 1992 that looked into whether mandatory audit firm 
rotation could be more effective than compulsory audit partner rotation in terms of improving 
audit quality and regains the trust of investors. The lack of audit independence between the 
company and its external auditor led to a poor performance of professional competence from 
the auditor‘s part; a serious case of negligence of their duty. This happened due to for many 
years ShinNihon had been in command of Toshiba, and had developed a false sense of 
assurance that Toshiba would not do such things. It can be seen that ShinNihon failed to apply 
accounting principles and auditing standards and using forensic auditing techniques to prevent, 
deter, and investigate fraud. The level of development of the stock market is influenced by the 
availability of accurate and reliable corporate financial information about firms'  financial  
performance  and  financial  position,  as  well  as  the appropriate legal and regulatory 
infrastructure, such as an effective Securities Exchange Commission, an active stock exchange 
market, and the accessibility of accurate and reliable corporate financial information about 
firms' financial performance and financial position. At the end of 2015, immediately after the 
announcement of Toshiba‘s annual record loss, Toshiba‘s stock price again plunged to 12%, 
which in total the company‘s stock price had been decreasing as much as 40% since their 
fraudulent financial statements scandal in April. Toshiba was declining periodically after the 
blow-up of the scandal. Investor sentiment can be used as the measurement for the market 
reaction towards the fraud because when investor sentiment on a company is high it‘s usually 
because investors are being optimistic and feel encouraged to buy the stocks, which then lead to 
the increasing price of the stock of that particular company. In other hand, when investors are 
being pessimistic toward the company, they would feel reluctant in buying the stocks and 
instead find other more attractive alternative. After matching the events in Table 6 and the 
down-shifting of Toshiba stock prices following the scandal, they reflect not only due to the 
financial loss that Toshiba was facing, but more importantly they reflect the loss of trust and 
confidence of investors caused by the fraud done by the internal party and the poor audit quality 





from Ernst & Young ShinNihon. 
 
4.3 Olympus and KPMG AZSA Case and Reputation Loss 
 
Event 1 took place in May 2009, Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, the former CEO of Olympus announced 
that their contract with its former auditor, KPMG AZSA, had ended. KMPG AZSA has been 
Olympus‘ external auditor for several years until 2009. The external auditor of Olympus found 
some inappropriate transactions in the company‘s books, this discovery later forced KPMG Azsa 
to warn the top executives of Olympus to resign if they did not want them to notify the Japanese 
authorities about the wrongful transactions. After some negotiations, Olympus agreed to wipe 
out ¥71 billion or $921 million of those transactions. In return, KPMG Azsa had to also agree to 
sign on Olympus‘ accounts with their unqualified opinion; addressing that there was not anything 
irregular with the financial statements of the company. Kikukawa decided not to mention any 
dispute with KPMG Azsa even though Japan has a strict rule of disclosure that requires 
companies to inform investors regarding the opinions of their external auditor. The investigation 
later revealed a confidential internal document written by Kikukawa to Olympus‘ executives in 
Europe and the United States saying that there had been disagreement between the company and 
its external auditor, which he stated that he did not intend to disclose with their investors. After 
the announcement of their ending contract with KPMG Azsa, the chief executive then had no 
choice but to open to public through a letter explaining that the dispute with KPMG Azsa was 
due to the company‘s acquisition of Gyrus, medical device company in United Kingdom, that 
costed $2.2 billion in 2008. No mention of KMPG Azsa‘s discoveries of irregular 
transactions in Olympus books. 
 
Event 2 covers the affair of Facta, a Japanese magazine that discusses the topic of economics, 
published an article that uncovered questionable transactions during Olympus‘ 2008 acquisition 
of Gyrus written by Yamaguchi Yoshimasa8. The article contains details of Olympus‘ 
involvement in an illegal practice of hiding its financial losses in 2011. The erupted scandal that 
happened to Olympus brought necessary questions about the importance of transparency in 
Japanese corporations and ignorance of the mainstream media to disclose more. Event 4 
happened as the direct effect of what happened in Event 3. Event 3 explains the affair in which 
Michael C. Woodford, whose position in Olympus at that time was as chief executive, decided to 
become the whistleblower. Woodford was the first non-Japanese to run the Japanese company 
that manufacture optical and reprography products. His suspicion started when a friend of his 
notified him through email that contains a translation version of an article from Facta that 
Yamaguchi Yoshimasa detailly wrote about Olympus. On October 14 2011, Woodford was then 
removed from his position after only working as the CEO for only a few weeks at a special 
meeting board that only lasted a few minutes. His dismissal was mainly because Woodford 
insisted in pressing questions and investigating the irregular transactions. Woodford‘s sudden 
removal drew a lot of attention especially after he decided to make an out-of-court settlement in 
regards to his dismissal. The news about the fraud in Olympus and Woodford as the 
whistleblower were covered in western news media such as The Sun, The Sunday Times, and 
The Independent where they praised him as the ―Businessperson of the Year‖. 
 
KPMG Azsa is another case example of audit failure that directly affected shareholders, 
investors, creditors, banks, and other entities that require a reliable financial report of 





businesses. Investors demand auditors to protect their investments from  the risk of fraud, 
despite the fact that financial statements audit is not particularly designed to detect fraud. The 
failure of KPMG Azsa to uncover Olympus accounting fraud gives a rationale for investors to 
look down on the financial statement quality of companies examined by KPMG Azsa, as well as 
the reputation of the auditors. However, very much different with the case of ChuoAoyama and 
Ernst & Young ShinNihon, KPMG Azsa did not intentionally neglect the irregularities in 
Olympus‘ financial reports due to its executives able to keep vital information of their financial 
positions, keeping them from detecting any red flags. Nevertheless, KPMG Azsa were not doing 
its duty as they failed to implement auditor‘s professional competence in exposing the 
manipulated financial performance of its client and also failed in applying their skepticism that 
should be critical and questioning every evidence that possibly indicate errors in the statements 
of Olympus.  
 
As mentioned above, the failure of KPMG Azsa to detect the fraud in Olympus‘ financial 
reports thus threatened the external parties such as investors, led to the stock owners to devalue 
the financial reports of companies that are also audited by KPMG Azsa. What will happen is 
that KPMG Azsa‘s clients stock price will turn negative due to investors‘ lack of trusts. 
Shortly after the public found out about the scandal, Olympus‘s stocks market values 
immediately fell 4.9%  which  made the total fall reached 45% only on the 5th day after the 
Japanese camera maker‘s issued statements with the purpose to ease the fears among their 
investors, which obviously failed. Even after Olympus has tried in dismissing their malpractice, 
it did not stop the collapse in its stock market value that finally reached 50% a week after the 
public announcements, which shows investors and  markets‘  lack  of  confidence.  The  reaction  
of distrust  and  lack  of confidence from investors were expressed through the significant drop 
on Olympus‘ stock price. 
 
5. Conclusion And Research Limitation 
The first core point of this research is to understand that the level of audit quality performed by 
the external auditors, which are the third-party hired by the shareholders and are expected to be 
unbiased or neutral, is able to determine the activity of stock markets. So, in order to have a 
broader understanding of how one can influence the other, this research uses three majors 
accounting scandals in Japan; Kanebo and ChuoAoyama in 2004, Olympus and KPMG Azsa in 
2011, and Toshiba and Ernst & Young ShinNihon in 2015. Second, through analyzing each 
event of the accounting scandal being publicized thus deteriorate the reputation of auditors, 
describing the audit failures based on each case, and analyzing the stock market performance 
following the scandal, we have a better grasp on the matter of how audit quality also plays a 
role in sustaining the stock markets‘ effectiveness. This research uses Case Study Analysis that 
helps the author to determine which specific event would cause market reaction in the form of 
shifting in stock prices, with the purpose of providing strong evidences. The common thing 
between Kanebo, Olympus, and Toshiba is that their malevolence acts in order cover their 
losses and inflate their earnings to present their financial statements as profitable to the investors. 
This research tries to explain that audit quality plays crucial role in determining the sentiment of 
the investors, considering that fraud, misstatement, or error in the financial statements can be 
detected and prevent providing poor audit quality if the auditors are able to implement the core 
functions and understand what are the indicators of audit quality.  






However, upon writing this research there has been some limitations, such as follows: 
 Obtaining data and sample of Kanebo and ChuoAoyama case. there is still unresolved 
question whether companies who chose to switch auditor from ChuoAoyama were 
purely because of the audit company‘s deteriorating reputation  caused  by  poor audit  
quality  or if  there is another reason. The author is unable to uncover the full reason of 
why all 2.300 clients of ChuoAoyama were switching to another external auditors after 
the accounting fraud because there was not enough data available that studies auditor 
switch during Kanebo and ChuoAoyama case. 
 Some data regarding to the state of Kanebo‘s stock prices were also unable to 
obtained due to the fact that they have been delisted from TSE. As explained in Chapter 
IV, Kanebo‘s accounting fraud was massive that the regulator had to completely delisted 
the company from TSE in order to maintain a fair, efficient, and also reliable market. 
Several suggestions regarding to the problems presented in this research are as follows: 
 
 The stock exchange regulator must oblige the companies who are listed to disclose the 
extent of their ties with external auditors. This information is crucial and should be 
stated in the company‘s financial statements as a way to assure the shareholders 
that the reports are reliable with the good opinion of the external auditors. 
 To minimize the risks of errors in the financial reports, whether they are intentional or 
unintentional, auditing should be designed to more properly recognize errors, especially 
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